Friday, September 21, 2007

LTTE Short of Ammo

The Sri Lanka Air Force has attacked two LTTE camps in the Mulaithivu District within the last 24-hours. Judging by aerial reconnaissance just released, it can be confirmed that two weapons dumps were hit in the attacks. Both dumps were located in relatively open terrain and hence the attacks were conducted with precision. The strategy behind the attacks is to cripple the LTTE’s weapons stocks. Intercepted communications by the Military Intelligence reveal that LTTE leaders have instructed their artillery units to use mortars and artillery shells sparingly.

The first attack was launched last morning and the latest attack was launched on the 21st evening. Official sources claimed that the second attack was made on a base housing the LTTE’s most loyal unit, the Imran-Pandyan unit. This unit provides close protection to the LTTE’s leader, V. Pripaharan and is commanded by an old-time Military-wing Cadre ‘Gadafi’. The unit was named after Pripaharan’s most loyal bodyguards. meanwhile LTTE sources have indicated that the buildings hit by the raid belonged to the Tamils Rehabilitation organization, an LTTE front organization.

Military Intelligence can confirm only the damage to the infrastructure and weapons dumps of the LTTE in such attacks. MI believes LTTE obtains early-warnings of such strikes through civilian informants attached to a local Airline Service housed next door to the Katunayake Air Base. They also believe that upon receipt of such early warnings, important LTTE cadres would seek the safety of Bomb-raid Shelters. The LTTE possesses two generations of SAM missiles, but are unable to attack the SLAF's number 10 Squadron. This is because of the high-speeds at which the jets travel and the changes to the flight-path. An analysis of the LTTE's successful attacks on SLAF craft reveals that they were often against slow-moving cargo planes which followed a flight path routinely along the West Coast.

Further confirmation of the damages caused to LTTE will be available through ground intelligence within the next few weeks. It is usually the LTTE’s practice to prohibit the movement of civilians out of the area following such an attack, for at least one week, to avoid such intelligence reaching the Security Forces.


Motivation, Greed or Grievance?

Theorists have examined the motivations underlying the creation and sustenance of rebel groups by their leaders. Paul Collier[1] argues that rebel groups are motivated primarily by greed. Collier attributes this concept to a theory of predation where rebel groups engage increasingly in criminal activities based more on greed than grievance. An analysis of rebel groups like the LTTE confirm that rebel groups are indeed raising funds through criminal activities and that part of these funds are filling the coffers of its leaders. The LTTE is estimated to be raising between $100-250 million annually through drug-trafficking, smuggling of contraband goods and arms trafficking[2]. Reports also indicate personal enrichment by the organizations leader, including evidence to suggest that at least one of his children has been educated in a western country.

However, many of the rebellions under study in other scholarly work seem to describe rebellion as a reaction to political or societal conditions (grievance). Ballentine and Nitzshke [3] argue that the question of greed versus grievance must be approached based on a political economy approach. They claim that although rebel groups have engaged in criminal activities for self financing, there is no conclusive evidence demonstrating a mutation of motives in rebel organizations from political aims to economic aims. The argument is based on an analysis of nine rebel movements in Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Burma. Ballentine and Nitzshke however state that in a rebellion political and economic agendas can be mutually reinforcing. Therefore it is safe to conclude that rebel organizations could have two agendas; one political and the other economic. Hence they could have both political and economic interests in sustaining conflict.

Unfortunately, and particularly in the case of Sri Lanka, it is often the grievance/political reasons that are commonly highlighted for the emergence of the LTTE. The greed/economic reason for rebel groups to sustain war is often completely disregarded. On the other hand, for a democratically elected government, sustaining war is an economic burden. Although a few rogue elements may make a ‘quick buck’ through arms procurements, a government as a whole will hardly gain any economic outcomes by waging war against a rebel group.



[1] Collier. P. (2001). Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy. In Crocker, C., Hampson, F.O., Aall, P. (Eds.) Turbulent Peace (pp. 143-162). Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 145

[2] Bhatt, S. & Mistry, D. Cost of Conflict in Sri Lanka. Strategic Foresight Group Report. Ehsaan Prints, Mumbai. 2006. P 65

[3] Ballentine, K. & Nitzshke, H. (2003, October). Beyond greed or grievance: Policy lessons from studies in the political economy of armed conflict. IPA Policy Report. International Peace Academy.

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