The Sri Lanka Army has been engaged in an interesting program to create specialized Divisions of men and machines for strategic purposes. Until recently, the military was relying on Motorized Infantry Units which would transport men into the battlefield in APCs, trucks etc during operations. The recent establishment of the 57th and 58th Divisions signals a need to combine the specific areas of strength of the Army into one Division to increase mobility and sustainability. The Mechanized Infantry Division comprises of seasoned men from the regular infantry units and Armored Units.
The Mechanized Infantry Divisions of WWI and II indicated certain weaknesses with regard to sustainability. Although highly mobile and fully capable at fast tactical infiltration into enemy territory, the Mechanized Infantry Units required a large team of support units to maintain the Mechanized Units (machines) and the infantry (men). Often the infantry has to keep up with the Mechanized Units and in warfare involving guerilla tactics, infantrymen have the added burden of defending its mechanized units. The battle for Muhamalai was an example of how Mechanized Infantry Units could fall prey to Guerilla Tactics.
The 57th and 58th Divisions of the Army have to rely on the Sri Lanka Air Force and the Army’s Artillery Units for fire support. A significant problem in using the Air Force is that it is another separate organization. Several past experiences of friendly fire and other issues of cross functional failure between the three Armed Forces have indicated that joint action can become time consuming, politicized and visible to the enemy. In an article written by DefenceWire it was revealed that the LTTE obtains early warnings of Air Attacks from sources at Katunayake. There is also very little to indicate close coordination between the 57th and 58th Divisions and the Air Force's Number 10 Fighter Squadron for example. Increased compartmentalization betwen the Armed Foces also eliminates knowledge and appreciation for the services of each particular Force. Communications systems, weapons systems, tactics and leadership styles of prominent Officers all differ significantly across the board.
An alternative to this problem is provided by the United States Marine Corp. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a balanced combined Armed Forces Package with an Organic Command with capacity to launch sustainable Ground and Aerial Attacks on an enemy. The MAGTF teams train and live together and is therefore highly cohesive. This allows Commanders to move at short-notice without revealing exact destinations, intentions or preparations for battle. These units, which have mobile Headquarters, do not rely on traditional bases or airfields and can be deployed within six hours of notice.
The capability of MAGTF is being recognized by the US Army in its role in Iraq’s Anbar Province. MAGTF could possibly replace the US Army in Afghanistan due to its Combined Armed Forces capability. Although Sri Lanka as a developing country cannot sustain a large expeditionary force, the need for Combined Armed Forces Packages could increase overall strike-power. The resources already available for such a transformation would include the new Mechanized Infantry Units, The Number 10 Fighter Jet Squadron and Number 09 Attack Helicopter Squadron of the Air Force, the Artillery/MBRL Units of the Army, in addition to the Elite Infantry units of the three forces and the Navy's FACs.
The Mechanized Infantry Divisions of WWI and II indicated certain weaknesses with regard to sustainability. Although highly mobile and fully capable at fast tactical infiltration into enemy territory, the Mechanized Infantry Units required a large team of support units to maintain the Mechanized Units (machines) and the infantry (men). Often the infantry has to keep up with the Mechanized Units and in warfare involving guerilla tactics, infantrymen have the added burden of defending its mechanized units. The battle for Muhamalai was an example of how Mechanized Infantry Units could fall prey to Guerilla Tactics.
The 57th and 58th Divisions of the Army have to rely on the Sri Lanka Air Force and the Army’s Artillery Units for fire support. A significant problem in using the Air Force is that it is another separate organization. Several past experiences of friendly fire and other issues of cross functional failure between the three Armed Forces have indicated that joint action can become time consuming, politicized and visible to the enemy. In an article written by DefenceWire it was revealed that the LTTE obtains early warnings of Air Attacks from sources at Katunayake. There is also very little to indicate close coordination between the 57th and 58th Divisions and the Air Force's Number 10 Fighter Squadron for example. Increased compartmentalization betwen the Armed Foces also eliminates knowledge and appreciation for the services of each particular Force. Communications systems, weapons systems, tactics and leadership styles of prominent Officers all differ significantly across the board.
An alternative to this problem is provided by the United States Marine Corp. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a balanced combined Armed Forces Package with an Organic Command with capacity to launch sustainable Ground and Aerial Attacks on an enemy. The MAGTF teams train and live together and is therefore highly cohesive. This allows Commanders to move at short-notice without revealing exact destinations, intentions or preparations for battle. These units, which have mobile Headquarters, do not rely on traditional bases or airfields and can be deployed within six hours of notice.
The capability of MAGTF is being recognized by the US Army in its role in Iraq’s Anbar Province. MAGTF could possibly replace the US Army in Afghanistan due to its Combined Armed Forces capability. Although Sri Lanka as a developing country cannot sustain a large expeditionary force, the need for Combined Armed Forces Packages could increase overall strike-power. The resources already available for such a transformation would include the new Mechanized Infantry Units, The Number 10 Fighter Jet Squadron and Number 09 Attack Helicopter Squadron of the Air Force, the Artillery/MBRL Units of the Army, in addition to the Elite Infantry units of the three forces and the Navy's FACs.
