Main Observations
The attack has all the hall-marks of the LTTE Leader's thinking. Eye for Eye, Assets for Assets. LTTE's sensitive spots have been touched by the Military. They were the floating warehouses. They can counter or replenish the loss of 10-15 cadres a day. This means they are not particularly sensitive to minor losses of men. But they cannot lose their supplies in such short succession. After all we are an island, remember?
The lost floating warehouses has hurt them much! The Sri Lanka Navy could be the LTTE's next target. Large warships particularly vulnerable.
The LTTE has a vast network of intelligence operatives in government areas, including Anuradhapura (one might say, of course!) but who has raised this issue so far and actually dealt with it? This could include safe houses, weapons smuggling etc. Was there an Army Intelligence Officer for Anuradhapura. I do not think so. Some Police and SLAF officers are in on the game. No planners considered Anuradhapura unsafe. But why? Isn't it a strategic location, like Vavuniya or Mannar, or even more?
Scenario-building: Worst-case Scenario
The LTTE has proven itself as a capable unconventional military force. adversely affected morale of the Tamil Diaspora will reverse. LTTE morale, fundraising, money-laundering, recruitment etc. will increase. LTTE will recover lost assets, replenish stocks and prepare for semi-conventional warfare. It will take own sweet time for next unconventional attack. Weakest point will be assessed/being assessed right now. Meanwhile Military Operations by Security Forces will be handicapped or 'intelligence blind' without aerial surveillance. No air support for ground troops. Once LTTE replenishes stocks and launches semi conventional war, there won't be any SLAF contribution on the ground. Unless new UAVs and Beachcraft procured, Kfir and Mig-27s are white elephants. Takeover of security coordination by Army, deployment of elite troops for missions other than those originally assigned for will put enormous strains on the Army's human resources.
Govt will shift cost of replenishing lost assets on the people. Economic burden on people will increase. Government will become unpopular with the people. Political pressure on government will also increase due to outbidding and outflanking by UNP. Government's attention will be diverted on two fronts. One will be military, the other Political. The support-base for a military solution will be strong but silent and calculating on the government's ability to deliver such. The pro-peace elements will have a field day!
Past Experiences
Joint Operations Command, Fort Railway Station etc bombed. LTTE Oyatha Alikal reached Jaffna City-limits. terrotory gained by Riviresa reversed. Agnikeela conventional operation results in severe losses. Katunayake Airbase and civilian airport attacked. Almost the entire fighter jet squadron destroyed. Insurance surcharge imposed by Lloyd's of London. Government forced to negotiate from a position of relative weakness in 2002 by reciprocating to LTTE's unilaterally declared Cease-Fire. Military debacles where over 1000 soldiers have been killed (Mullaithivu, Elephant Pass, Kilinochchi etc). One President killed, one maimed for life. Navy Commander killed, Army's 3rd Highest Ranker killed, Generals (Kobbekaduwa etc) killed. Foreign Minister and other important Ministers killed.
Recent Experiences
Army changes tactics. The Eastern Province 'liberated'. Navy destroys 11 LTTE floating ware-houses.
A Game of Choice
Which of the following do we choose as an option?
1. Neither party can win this war
2. Government will win eventually
3. LTTE will establish Eelam eventually
Given the recent and past events, a reasonable assumption would be that neither party will win the war. The other two options are what you make of them. For example, if a party wants to make the second choice 'Government will win eventually' a reality, we must make that happen. Similarly if the LTTE wants to establish Eelam, they too must make that happen. They both will use the same tactics; a mixture between military power and political power. They both will use the international community to legitimize its cause etc.
Conclusion
Ultimately, it all brews down to one issue. Its true that this battle has been won by LTTE. The Security Forces have won their battles too. But the bottom line is who will win the war will rely on who really needs to win?
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Findings and Observations
Every Cloud Has a Silver Lining?
Altogether 23 aircraft have been lost in the attack on the Anuradhapura Airbase. The most valuable craft lost included the Beechcraft, two brand-new UAVs and one highly sophisticated UAV with thermal glare detection capability. The LTTE has thus completely annihilated the aerial reconnaissance capability of the Armed Forces.
The 20 member team had entered the base by cutting a portion of the wire fence. Military Intelligence (SLA) piecing together the attack believe at least a small recce team had done primary intelligence -gathering many days prior to the attack. They were well aware of the entry/exit points of the base, the location of the UAV and Beech King hangars and also the absence of the Air Force Regimental Special Forces at the base.
The Black Tiger unit, considered the most lethal force in the LTTE next to the Black Sea Tigers, had little problem in countering SLAF units that challenged them. In fact, SLAF units were unable to trace the Black Tigers and launch effective counter attacks. Although the group was a potential 'write off' for the LTTE considering they were a suicide unit, the Tigers were preparing for a total takeover of the base. After destroying the aircraft in the base the Black Tigers turned to hoisting Tamil Ealam Flags inside the SLAF base. However, the fortunes of the Tiger unit soon began to change.
A 40-man elite team of Special Forces was on their way from Vavuniya. The unit, a part of a much larger Special Forces operation ahead of the Vavuniya FDL, was successfully engaging the LTTE's other elite units, including the Charles Anthony Regiment when Military Planners withdrew them from their original task. Led by a Special Forces Major from the 2nd Special Forces Brigade, the unit was knowledgeable of the Base inside-out, having previously trained in airborne operations from the base. The SF team was a highly capable fighting formation. Within minutes of being airborne, the unit started battle preparations. Arriving in two waves, the unit went into immediate action. They were capable of locating and completely annihilating the Black Tiger unit within a matter of few hours. Suicide cadres or not, the Black Tigers were no match for the powerful Special Forces. Their 'handiwork', captured in gruesome images, are available on defence.lk and is perhaps the only success story in this whole debacle.
The Sri Lanka Air Force base at Anuradhapura may have been the country's most ill-prepared military base. Army intelligence units now tasked with investigating the debacle claim the base had no contingency plan or proper security-drills or rehearsals done prior to the attack. The attack is the result of negligence, improper orientation, inadequate training and a lack of alertness on the part of the men. A severe leadership problem, lack of experience but luxurious and self-indulgent lifestyles are observed as the main weaknesses on the part of the Officers at the base. A close observation between the Sri Lanka Air Force and the other two main Armed Forces reveals serious institutional failures in the SLAF which seems to operate like a nine-to-five private firm more than an Armed Force fighting a ruthless guerrilla organization.
Changes after Debacle
Sri Lanka's military made key changes in its command and operational structure today, a day after the Black Tiger suicide squad destroyed more than a dozen air crafts in the Anuradhapura air base, officials said. President Mahinda Rajapaksha, who is also the commander in chief of the armed forces has appointed Major General Sanath Karunartne, a battle-hardened officer as the Overall Operation Commander(OOC) a newly created post for district of Anuradhapura, with immediate effect.
Former military spokesman Karunartne has been credited with defending the army's Elephant Pass garrison with 600 soldiers against prolonged Tiger attack in 1991. The base was later lost to the LTTE in 2000, hen there were 2200 troops at the camp. He was also able to defeat the LTTE's repeated attempts to enter Jaffna peninsular in late last year before taking over the duties as General Officer commanding at army's 11th Division operated from Panagoda cantonment.
His appointment is in addition to the Defence Secretary's order to take over outer perimeter security of all domestic airports in the country by Army. Elite Special Forces troops will take over some of the air force bases according to latest arrangements, it is learnt. However the move would not make the Air Force happy and there is a possibility that this could erupt into crossfunctional and operational problems with both forces, military analyzers say.
Yesterday's devastated attack into the airbase resulted in at least 17 aircraft destroyed or out of operation, causing at least US$40 million lost to the government, which is strugling to overcome incresing defence expenditure in the country. Country's next year's defence expenditure rised sharply by 19.4% compared to this year's budgeted of Rs.139billions. The lost would create a direct impact on Air Force especially on their short and medium caliber attacks against the Tigers.
Needless to say the lost assets of the Air Force also undermine the training and transport facilities, including the operational and reconnaissance support for other forces.
