The Principles of War

"You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war." - Napoleon Bonaparte

Military theoreticians have long established some fundamental principles of war, which have remained unchanged for several thousand years. These principles are incorporated into modern warfare as the art of war became the science of war. The Principles of War (1) and the adherence to it by the Army and LTTE can be analyzed as follows;

• Objective- Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. As Clausewitz pointed out “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war.” Although an unconventional army, the LTTE has maintained a clear objective in mind (Eelam- a politico-military objective). The Sri Lanka Army has a new military objective under General Fonseka. It is now upto the politicians to create a political objective better than Eelam.
• Offensive- Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Until 2005, the LTTE dominated offensive actions, which role is now being replaced by the Army.
• Mass- Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. The LTTE’s Oyatha Alaikal/ Ceaseless Waves are a good example of this strategy. However, not a single Ceaseless Wave was launched recently. The Army has its own force concentrations under Task Force I and II. However, these concentrated forces are rarely deployed in mass, thus eliminating high casualty rates unlike Agnikeela and Muhamalai debacles. The modus operandi of the new Mechanized Infantry Regiment is yet unclear, but furthers the application of this principle by the SLA.
• Economy of force- Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. The Army’s adherence to this principle is currently being tested by the LTTE through attacks in the south. The Army is also testing the LTTE in the same area through LRRP operations.
• Maneuver- Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power. Both sides apply this principle against each other by attempting to off balance each other by posing new problems and new dangers faster than a side can deal with them.
• Unity of command- For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. This is a highly politicized issue in a three forces command. Rebel forces are monolithic and have better success at assigning the right responsibilities to the right command. LTTE commanders are given objectives to achieve and the rank and file must comply, or pay with their lives. Recently, the Army has instilled a greater sense of responsibility and accountability to the command. Recent appointments, promotions, demotions and transfers were based on merit and not on seniority or political allegiance.
• Security- Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. The LTTE has been at the receiving end of this principle lately, with the loss of weapons ships, ‘Col. Charles’, Thamilselvan etc. The military too suffered (i.e. Anuradhapura attack), but less in terms of loses suffered in 1996-2002.
• Surprise- Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. This is the LTTE’s forte and it hasn’t failed them yet. The Sri Lankan military has also improved in this area through surprise attacks on Tiger leadership and assets.
• Simplicity- Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Again, the rebels hold the advantage. No PowerPoint presentations required in briefing LTTE leaders or rank and file. The SLA has also recently transformed. The language of communication at all levels of the command shifted from English to ‘layman’ Sinhala. The present Commander of the Army and the Defence Secretary played a role in this and also in separating political plans from military plans.

Conventional Armies and state militaries evolve by incorporating experiences through reflection, generalization, theorization and reapplication. This is an advantage of an institutionalized Army. The disadvantage is the amount of time consumed in transforming learning into new strategies. Repetition of the same strategy without innovation can backfire. As Sun Tzu once said "Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.”

(1) US Army Field Manual, FM 3-0, Chapter 4.

Heavy Clashes in Jaffna

Map courtesy Asian Tribune

Sri Lanka Army, advancing southwards from own lines at the crack of dawn today from Muhamalai and Nagarkovil attacked a line of LTTE bunkers capturing around 25 defensive structures (bunkers) of the LTTE. Several hours later, SLAF jets dropped at least 4 bombs on a Tiger Field Command Post at Wedukaadu, 2km south of Tiger FDL Muhamalai.

Again at around 6.35pm, troops backed by four T-55 Tanks from the newly formed Mechanized Infantry Regiment advanced back into the LTTE controlled area in Muhamalai and Nagarkovil, decimating 10 more bunkers and killing 10 more Tigers. The total casualties (KIA) in the LTTE could be around 35. At least a dozen soldiers with serious injuries were also admitted to hospital.

Meanwhile the civilian death-toll in yesterday's attack at Periyamadu has risen to twenty. 11 are school children. All efforts made by DefenceWire to independently verify whether the attack was launched by an LRRP team turned up without any result. Sources however assured that such an attack would never be launched, unless as a mistaken identity, which is unlikely in this case. On previous occasions, we are aware of small teams (not LRRP) attacking suspected double cabs and other 'Tamil Eelam' vehicles, accidentally killing or injuring civilians.