LTTE Short of Ammo

The Sri Lanka Air Force has attacked two LTTE camps in the Mulaithivu District within the last 24-hours. Judging by aerial reconnaissance just released, it can be confirmed that two weapons dumps were hit in the attacks. Both dumps were located in relatively open terrain and hence the attacks were conducted with precision. The strategy behind the attacks is to cripple the LTTE’s weapons stocks. Intercepted communications by the Military Intelligence reveal that LTTE leaders have instructed their artillery units to use mortars and artillery shells sparingly.

The first attack was launched last morning and the latest attack was launched on the 21^st evening. Official sources claimed that the second attack was made on a base housing the LTTE’s most loyal unit, the Imran-Pandyan unit. This unit provides close protection to the LTTE’s leader, V. Pripaharan and is commanded by an old-time Military-wing Cadre ‘Gadafi’. The unit was named after Pripaharan’s most loyal bodyguards. meanwhile LTTE sources have indicated that the buildings hit by the raid belonged to the Tamils Rehabilitation organization, an LTTE front organization.

Military Intelligence can confirm only the damage to the infrastructure and weapons dumps of the LTTE in such attacks. MI believes LTTE obtains early-warnings of such strikes through civilian informants attached to a local Airline Service housed next door to the Katunayake Air Base. They also believe that upon receipt of such early warnings, important LTTE cadres would seek the safety of Bomb-raid Shelters. The LTTE possesses two generations of SAM missiles, but are unable to attack the SLAF's number 10 Squadron. This is because of the high-speeds at which the jets travel and the changes to the flight-path. An analysis of the LTTE's successful attacks on SLAF craft reveals that they were often against slow-moving cargo planes which followed a flight path routinely along the West Coast.

Further confirmation of the damages caused to LTTE will be available through ground intelligence within the next few weeks. It is usually the LTTE’s practice to prohibit the movement of civilians out of the area following such an attack, for at least one week, to avoid such intelligence reaching the Security Forces.