How strong are the Tamil Tigers?

The Tamil Tigers are notorious for their desperate suicide attacks. Considering the impact of suicide bombing in the media, it would not be a surprise. When analyzing the LTTE’s successful attacks, no clues are available that indicate that they are based on regular conventional tactics. The analysis can be grounded on the US Army frames for determining insurgents’ capabilities (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p110). The Field Manual categorizes insurgent capabilities as follows;

• Forms of violent action used
• Weapons available and their capabilities
• Training
• Known methods of operating: frequency of attacks, timing of attacks, targets of attacks and techniques.
• Known linkages between violent, political, and information actions: How do the insurgents use violence to increase their popular support and undermine counterinsurgents?
• Means of command and control during attacks (including communication means used)

A further indicator of the Insurgent cum terrorist cum guerilla nature of the organization emerges from its deployment of men/women. The following table is an independent analysis of the LTTE’s man/woman-power.

Types	Numbers
Civilian Militia Members / Auxiliaries	15,000 Mostly non-combatant members with basic training of assault rifles
Regular Infantry + Special forces	6,000 (including 2,000 special forces: the anti-armour regiment, Charles Anthony Brigade, Leopard Commandos)
Naval Unit	2,000 Including ex Tamil fishermen, supporting staff

Both the classification of insurgents and the manpower of the Tigers indicate that the organization is prone to the heavy use of unconventional tactics visible to the media and that they are not a genuine conventional fighting force. In fact, the conventional units of the organization can be limited to the 6000 regular cadres comprising Charles Anthony, Imran Pandyan, Malathi etc units.

The SLA’s current mixture of both conventional and unconventional offensive raids could disturb the morale of the 15,000 strong volunteer or auxiliary units of the Tigers, thus forcing further extreme behaviour from the regular units, who are currently under a great deal of pressure. This may effectively tie down the LTTE’s elite and more experienced regulars whilst SLA elite units are freed to engage in planned attacks inside LTTE-controlled areas.

The only other option for a highly marketable attack over the media would have to come from the Black Tigers and the Black Sea Tigers. However, due to lengthy operational planning involved, it is not possible to make such attacks on a regular basis. The other issue is the enormous resilience of the southern people, politicians and the Military to these attacks, having experienced them since 1983.

The success of these attacks will depend on the destruction of Military Assets or Military/political leadership. Unfortunately for the LTTE, numerous such attacks have not had lasting impact on bringing down southern governments, destruction of the Military Machine or in the creation of a defeatist mentality in the south, as evidenced by the current status quo.